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Abstract 
This paper assesses to what extent consumers are willing to make use of the 
features and capabilities offered by smart meters. Via a choice experiment 
households are offered the choice between a set of smart meters, described 
by six attributes: impact on the comfort and privacy level, functionality, 
visibility, cost savings and investment outlay. 
We estimate a main effects conditional logit model and a main effects 
random parameter logit model, including interactions with socio-
demographic characteristics. The results show that households have 
heterogeneous preferences for some attributes but not for others. The 
estimates are then used to assess marginal willingness to pay values. From a 
policy perspective, the results suggest that sufficient effort should be devoted 
to designing the smart metering devices and to informing households. 
Without careful preparation, a mandatory or voluntary roll out of smart 
meters risks to be unsuccessful because device characteristics do not meet 
consumer needs. 
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Valuing Smart Meters 
1. Introduction 
Lack of demand response is seen as one of the major challenges in the electricity system 
as it exists today. It is however expected that, driven by technological evolution, 
demand response will be introduced on a large scale in the next decade or so and that a 
crucial role in this evolution will played by ‘smart meters’. 
A smart meter is a device installed at the consumer’s premises, that measures real-time 
electricity consumption in greater detail than conventional meters do and allows two-
way communication with the distribution system operator or any other operator that is 
granted access. This information can then be used for monitoring or billing purposes or 
to help maintaining the quality of different services provided by utilities (e.g. detection 
of power outage control, meter reading, simplification of the billing procedure, 
identifying unauthorized bypass of the meter) (Neenan and Hemphill (2008), Faruqui et 
al. (2014)). But, perhaps most important, smart meters can also contribute to a more 
efficient electricity market by conveying information on real-time prices and load to 
customers, allowing them to respond by increasing or decreasing demand. The 
magnitude of the response will depend upon the price and/or load information that is 
communicated, but also on the capabilities of the smart meter and the respondent’s 
willingness to make use of these capabilities. The response itself could be initiated by 
the consumer, could be automated, or could be left to a third party, for example the 
distribution company, that remotely controls the usage of electric appliances via the 
smart metering devices. 
Policy makers have recognized the potential benefits of smart meters and have taken 
several legislative initiatives to increase their market penetration rates. For example, in 
the US, the Energy Policy Act 2005 and the Energy Independence and Security Act 
2007 are at the basis of Federal demand response and smart metering policies. Next to 
these Federal initiatives, many states have also taken own initiatives. See Pietsch (2012) 
for a survey. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (2013) reports a US (survey 
based) penetration rate of just over 30% in 2013, coming from 4.7% in 2007. However, 
penetration rates vary widely from State to State (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (2012)). In 2012 the three highest penetration rates were found in the 
District of Colombia (87.1%), California (70.5%) and Idaho (66.1%). Nine states had a 
penetration rate above 50%, while 26 (15) states had a penetration rate of less than 10% 
(5%). 
In the European Union, the Directives providing the basis for the introduction of smart 
metering devices are the Energy Services Directive 2006/32/EC, Directive 2009/72/EC, 
being part of the so-called Third Energy Package, and Directive 2012/27/EU on energy 
efficiency (Hierzinger et al. (2013)). In summary, these three Directives i) mandate the 
installation of smart metering devices in all Member States, provided that a roll-out of 
the devices is assessed positively via a cost-benefit analysis, and ii) expect a positive 
impact on energy consumption of a timely, clear and frequent communication to 
customers of their energy use and the related energy cost. Obviously, this presupposes 
behavioural responses. 
In 2013, most Member States had carried out this cost-benefit analysis and a majority 
was in the process of introducing smart meters in their energy markets, although not all 
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countries have made equal progress (ACER (2013), Hierzinger et al. (2013) and 
Giordano et al. (2013)). Italy and Sweden have already completed a full roll-out, while 
another 11 EU Member States have officially decided to go ahead with the roll-out
2
. 
Three countries have decided not to proceed, based on a negative cost-benefit analysis 
(Belgium, Czech Republic and Lithuania)
3
. Eleven Member States did not reach a final 
decision yet
4
. 
The outcomes of these cost-benefit assessments crucially depend on the magnitude of 
demand response that is triggered. Faruqui and Sergici (2010), Faruqui and Palmer 
(2012), Newsham and Bowker (2010) and Stromback et al. (2011) survey the results of 
recent pilots and field experiments of smart metering and dynamic pricing, both in the 
US and worldwide. They all conclude that households do indeed respond to higher 
prices by lowering demand, but also that the magnitude of the response, measured as the 
percentage reduction of peak demand, depends on a number of elements of which the 
type of pricing scheme is only one
5
. 
Another element, also mentioned as important, is technology. The same survey studies 
report that the magnitude of demand response significantly increases when enabling 
technologies such as, for example, two-way communication, smart thermostats or in-
home displays are used. This is confirmed by Joskow (2012), who concludes that 
technologies and information that make it easier for consumers to respond to price 
signals lead to larger responses to any given price change, suggesting that the 
functionalities of the smart metering device are important. Furthermore, Giordano et al. 
(2013) also conclude from the pilots they survey that long term sustainable change in 
electricity usage can only be achieved when enabling technologies and automated 
systems are used. 
However, Giordano et al. (2013), and Stromback et al. (2011) stress that, next to 
enabling technologies, a successful roll-out of smart meters will also crucially depend 
on consumer engagement. They note that consumer resistance can be a significant 
barrier and thus remains a key issue. Violations of privacy and fear of losing control 
over electricity usage are two examples that could feed this consumer resistance 
(Krishnamurti et al. (2012) and Joskow (2012)). 
The importance of consumer engagement is illustrated by Faruqui et al. (2010). They 
estimate that the present value of the net benefits of rolling-out smart meters in the EU 
could be in the order of magnitude of €50 billion, on the condition that dynamic pricing 
schemes are successfully introduced and used on a large scale. When dynamic pricing 
schemes are not offered by suppliers or not used by the customers, then much of the 
potential benefits of smart metering will not be realized. This could make the difference 
between negative and positive net benefits for EU smart metering project as a whole. 
                                                 
2 These countries are Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta, Spain, The Netherlands and the 
UK. 
3 Based on data collected from the National Regulatory Authorities, the Council of European Energy Regulators (2013) reports on 
the results of the assessment exercises in the European Union. 18 countries carried out a CBA, 13 of which resulted in a positive 
outcome and 3 in a negative outcome. For two countries (Denmark and Portugal) the outcome is unknown. 
4 These countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
5 Note that research on (the magnitude of) demand response is ongoing, as is illustrated by the EU FP7 ADVANCED (Active 
Demand Value ANd Consumers Experience Discovery) research project (http://www.advancedfp7.eu/). This project aims at 
drawing lessons from the analysis of available data of four real live demonstration projects, the VaasaETT database and many 
other active demand databases with secondary data. Other research projects in the field of smart grids and smart metering are the 
European FP7 ADDRESS project (http://www.addressfp7.org/) and the Meter-ON project (http://www.meter-on.eu/). 
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In this paper we concentrate on the link between enabling technologies and consumer 
engagement. Our question is to what extent consumers are willing to make use of the 
features and capabilities offered by smart meters. Thus, we do not focus on the role of 
dynamic pricing schemes, as it is done in many pilot studies and field experiments, but 
rather on the impact of the features and capabilities of the devices as such. Essentially, 
we want to find out to what extent households are willing to use the capabilities offered 
by smart metering devices. 
A choice experiment was set up in which smart metering devices, differing in terms of 6 
characteristics, are being offered to consumers. Based on their stated choices, we then 
estimate the value of each of these attributes and of the devices as a whole. The choice 
experiment was carried out in Flanders in the first half of 2011. We think that, despite 
the relatively limited number of respondents, the conclusions are valuable and useful for 
both public and private policy making as the policy debate regarding a mandatory or 
voluntary roll-out of smart metering devices is ongoing in many countries. The results 
allow to identify the positively and negatively valued attributes of the metering devices, 
and may thereby increase the likelihood of a successful roll-out. 
Whereas in the past, revealed preference approaches were mostly used to assess 
preferences, we now observe that, for many applications, more and more use is being 
made of stated preference techniques. A stated preference method, more specifically a 
choice experiment, will also be used in this paper. To our knowledge, a similar exercise 
has not been made before in the context of smart metering devices. 
Choice experiments have however been used in other energy related areas. For example, 
Bergmann et al. (2006) use a choice experiments to investigate the WTP for green 
electricity, where green energy is described in terms of its environmental attributes, 
such as, landscape impact, wildlife impact and air pollution. Longo et al. (2008) have 
set up a choice experiment in which four potential effects of a renewables policy are 
being considered: GHG emission reductions, short term security of supply (blackouts), 
employment effects and the price impact. Scarpa and Willis (2010) investigate the 
households’ WTP for renewable micro electricity generation technologies in the UK, 
while Borchers et al. (2007), use choice experiments to focus on the input side of green 
electricity rather than on the output side. Revelt and Train (1998) use a choice 
experiment to assess the relative value for households of refrigerators with different 
efficiency levels. Banfi et al. (2008) focus on the WTP of households, either owners or 
tenants, for air renewal systems and improved window and facade insulation, while 
Shen and Saijo (2009) use the choice experiment approach to assess the impact of 
energy efficiency labels on the consumer’s WTP for air conditioners and refrigerators in 
Shanghai. In the context of short term security of supply or power outages, choice 
experiment applications can be found in Beenstock et al. (1998), Carlsson and 
Martinsson (2008) and Pepermans (2010). 
The following section briefly introduces the choice experiment methodology, some 
relevant literature and the techniques used in this paper to estimate the preference 
structure. Section 3 then describes the Belgian and Flemish electricity market and the 
data. Section 4 discusses the estimation results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
The basic idea of a choice experiment is quite simple: respondents are asked to evaluate 
sets of hypothetical items (goods, services, options, projects…). Each item is described 
by a number of typical characteristics or attributes and within each set, the respondent 
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then has to indicate the item he or she prefers. These stated choices reveal information 
about preferences and can be used to assess the relative value of the different attributes 
describing the items
6
. 
2.1. Theoretical background 
Choice experiment data are typically analyzed with conditional logit models. As Train 
(2003) and Moore (2008) point out, one drawback of the standard conditional logit 
model is that homogenous preferences are assumed. We will therefore also present the 
results of a Random Parameters or Mixed Logit Model (Train (2003)) as an alternative 
approach that allows for preference heterogeneity. In this model, unobserved 
preferences are assumed to follow a predefined structure. Individual-specific covariates 
can be added as interaction variables to further explain preference heterogeneity. The 
parameters of this pre-imposed preference structure are estimated together with the 
parameters of the other covariates. See Morey and Rossmann (2003) and Moore (2008) 
for illustrations of this approach. 
Alternatively, heterogeneous preferences could also be introduced via a latent class 
model along the lines of Morey et al. (2006) or Boxall and Adamowicz (2002). Morey 
et al. (2006) considers group or class membership as exogenous, whereas Boxall and 
Adamowicz (2002) assume group membership to be endogenous. Moore (2008) 
compares the three modeling approaches and concludes that assuming heterogeneous 
preferences adds to the explanatory power of the models. Furthermore, he finds that, 
despite differences in the underlying assumptions and in the parameter estimates, the 
WTP-estimates derived from the three models show little difference. Therefore, from a 
policy perspective the main message is that it does not matter how preference 
heterogeneity is included in empirical models, as long as it is included. In this paper, we 
will thus use the mixed logit approach to allow for heterogeneity in preferences. 
The Random Utility Model 
The Random Utility Model (RUM) is used to analyse household preferences. The RUM 
is based on random utility theory which starts from the assumption that decision units 
maximize utility. Let decision unit n  face T  consecutive choice problems each of 
which implies a choice to be made between J  alternatives. From each alternative j , a 
utility level njtU  can be obtained, which is known to the decision unit but is only 
partially observed by the researcher, i.e. 
 njt njt njtU V     (1) 
with njtV  observed utility and njt  unobserved utility, represented as a random term. For 
each choice problem C , a decision unit will select the alternative that provides maximal 
utility. The presence of the random component in equation (1) implies that only 
probabilistic statements can be made about the decision unit’s choices. Thus, the 
probability of choosing alternative j  from choice set C  can be written as 
 
   
 
,
, .
njt njt nit
njt nit nit njt
P j C P P U U i j C
P V V i j C 
     
      
  (2) 
                                                 
6 We refer to Bateman et al. (2002) and Amaya-Amaya et al. (2008) for a more elaborate discussion of the CE technique. 
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Assuming that 
njt  is i.i.d. type I extreme value and that observed utility is linear in the 
parameters (i.e. njt njtV x ), it can be shown that 
 
njt
nit
x
njt x
i C
e
P
e





 (3) 
with njtx  a vector of alternative-specific attributes and   the vector of parameters to be 
estimated. Equation (3) defines the conditional logit model which is the basic model to 
analyse conjoint choice data. 
The conditional logit model assumes homogeneous preferences, which is rather extreme 
assumption that can be relaxed either by interacting socio-demographic characteristics 
with product attributes or by allowing tastes to vary over the population with density 
 f   (Train (2003)). We can then rewrite observed utility as njt n njtV x , where the 
heterogeneity of preferences is now made explicit by indexing  . Note that n  is 
assumed constant over time, i.e. preferences of decision unit n  are stable over 
consecutive choice situations, which for the current application is a realistic assumption. 
In this paper, we assume all preferences to follow a normal density, except for the 
preferences for cost savings which follow a lognormal distribution. 
Assuming that njt  is i.i.d. extreme value over decision units, alternatives and time, we 
can write the conditional probability that a decision maker will make a given sequence 
of choices  1 2, ,..., Tj j jj  as 
  
1
n njt
n nit
xT
n n x
t
i C
e
e







jL .   
As the researcher does not know n , he or she has to consider all possible values of   
to arrive at the unconditional choice probability of decision unit n  choosing the 
sequence of alternatives j : 
  
1
,
n njt
n nit
xT
n x
t
i C
e
P f d
e

 
   


 
 
  
 
 
 
j .  (4) 
Equation (4) cannot be solved analytically, but simulation techniques can be used to 
solve for the preference parameters that maximize the simulated log-likelihood 
function
7
 (Train (2003)). 
Model specification 
In its most general form, observed utility derived from alternative i  is written as (the 
subscript n  is omitted to simplify notation): 
                                                 
7 Actual estimations were done with STATA’s mixlogit procedure. 
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 ASC k k m m k Iit j j it it it
j C k m
U ASC Z X I     

 
      
 
     (5) 
where jASC  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if j i  and zero otherwise
8
, kX  is 
attribute k  and I  is a continuous variable expressing the investment outlay in euro’s. 
The variables mZ  are socio-demographic characteristics. Finally, k  reflects individual 
specific preference deviations, i.e. remaining unexplained heterogeneity in preferences. 
The variables mZ  and k  will be introduced in the mixed logit model but not in the 
conditional logit model. 
Although the choice experiment approach does not provide direct estimates, WTP 
values can be estimated indirectly via the estimated parameters of equation (5). In the 
next section we will discuss how this can be done. 
2.2. Estimating the Willingness-to-Pay 
Under the assumption of a standard conditional logit model with observed utility linear 
in income (see eq. (5)) , the consumer surplus associated with a set of alternatives takes 
a closed form that is easy to calculate (see also Train (2003)). The consumer surplus 
derived from the chosen alternative i  is simply the utility derived from that alternative, 
expressed in monetary terms. Knowing that a decision maker chooses the alternative 
that maximizes his or her utility, the consumer surplus is 
  
1
maxn njI j C
CS U
 
   (6) 
with I  representing the preference parameter related to the monetary attribute. 
Dividing by I  converts utility into monetary terms. However, the researcher does not 
observe the utility njU  linked to the utility maximizing alternative. He only observes njV  
and he knows the distribution of the error term. Therefore, only expected consumer 
surplus can be calculated, i.e. 
     1 E maxn nj njI j CE CS V      (7) 
McFadden (1973) and McFadden (1995) show that, if nj  is i.i.d. extreme value and 
utility is linear in income (i.e. I , the marginal utility of income, is constant), then this 
expression reduces to
9
 
  
1
ln nj
V
n I
j C
E CS e K
 
 
  
 
   (8) 
with K  a number known as Euler’s constant. An alternative interpretation of equation 
(8) is that  nE CS  is the average consumer surplus in the subpopulation of people who 
                                                 
8 A maximum of two alternative specific constants can be included. Including a third ASC for the status quo would cause 
multicollinearity problems. 
9 A more complex formulation of the change in consumer surplus is needed when the marginal utility of income is not constant. 
However, when marginal utility of income is constant over a range of income levels that correspond to the policy, then equation 
(8) can also be used (Train (2003), p. 61). 
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have the same representative utilities as consumer n . The total consumer surplus can 
then be calculated as the weighted sum of  nE CS  over a sample of decision makers, 
with the weights reflecting the number of people in the population who face the same 
representative utilities as the sampled person (Yu (2003), p. 60). 
The change in consumer surplus that results from a change in the alternatives and/or the 
choice set is then equal to 
  
1
ln ln
After Before
nj nj
After Before
V V
n I
j C j C
E CS e e
  
     
         
     
    (9) 
When the purpose is to compare two alternatives or profiles, for example the base case 
(the status quo) and an altered case, and if both deterministic utility terms between 
accolades are linear in the attributes, then equation (9) reduces to 
    
1 After Before
n n nI
E CS V V

     (10) 
If the purpose is to evaluate the change in one attribute and if deterministic utility is 
linear in the attributes, then equation (10) further reduces to the ratio of the marginal 
utility of the attribute and the marginal utility of income, also known as the marginal 
willingness to pay
10
. 
For models in which only main effects are estimated (as will be the case in this paper), 
the marginal willingness to pay by household n  for a change in a single attribute k  is 
defined as 
 
k k m m
n
k m
n I
Z
WTP
  

  
  
 
 
 

  (11) 
3. The data 
The data were collected in the Flemish residential electricity market as part of an 
exploratory market study for a small technological firm that planned to introduce its 
own smart metering technology
11
. Based on a literature survey and a pilot study, we 
identified six attributes and corresponding levels to describe a smart meter (Table 1). 
Obviously, potential cost savings are an important characteristic of any smart metering 
device. Six levels of cost savings were considered. At the explicit request of the firm, 
the highest level offered was 60% of cost savings per year, which is very high. As such 
high levels for the cost savings attribute might play a dominant role in people’s choice 
behavior, we have checked for this in the empirical analysis. 
Comfort and privacy impact, and the functionality of the devices are mentioned in many 
studies and discussions as relevant aspects to take into account. Each of these attributes 
could take three qualitatively described levels. 
                                                 
10 Champ, Boyle et al. (2003), p. 195-196. 
11 The data were collected as part of a master thesis project. 
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A point of concern might be that, in practice, the cost savings variable will be correlated 
with Comfort impact. Reducing the electricity bill by 60% through demand response is 
likely to lead to a severe reduction in comfort, unless households would have been 
extremely inefficient in their electricity consumption at the start. A smart metering 
profile resulting in a 60% cost reduction without impact on comfort is thus not very 
realistic. However, in the design of the current choice experiment, we did not take this 
into account. 
The visibility attribute was added at the explicit request of the firm as it was still 
considering different design options. Finally, the investment cost was added as the 
monetary attribute, allowing to calculate WTP values. The selected range of investment 
cost levels is in line with Giordano et al. (2013) who report that, depending on scale, 
communication technology, implemented functionalities and specific local conditions, 
the cost per device in current European pilot studies varies between €100 and €400 per 
device. 
Respondents were told they had the choice to either buy a smart meter with the 
specified characteristics or to keep the currently installed standard meter
12
. Throughout 
the survey, it was implicitly assumed that the metering device had an infinite lifetime. 
The choice experiment had a full factorial design of 56 3 1458   profiles. We selected 
a subset of 18 profiles such that – with some loss of information – the most important 
and relevant effects could be estimated. The design used in this paper allowed 
estimating all main effects while giving maximal consideration to balancing, 
orthogonality and minimal overlap of levels within choice sets
13
. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Choice sets were created following the principles outlined in Street et al. (2005). An 
opt-out option was included, allowing respondents not to purchase or indicate any of the 
proposed devices. Asking respondents to evaluate 18 choice sets was considered not 
realistic. We therefore created two blocks of 9 randomly selected choice sets. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate one of these blocks, based on whether they were 
born in an odd of even month. A small pre-test showed that respondents considered 
evaluating 9 choice sets a feasible and not too burdensome task. 
3.1. Background information on the Belgian and Flemish electricity market 
Flanders is one of the three regions in Belgium, next to Wallonia and Brussels Capital 
Region. Energy competences in Belgium have been divided between the Federal state 
and it’s three regions. Competences related to non-renewable electricity generation 
capacity and transmission are allocated to the Federal level, while competences related 
to distribution and retail activities, to energy efficiency and renewable policy are 
allocated to the regions. The Belgian electricity market counts about 5.3 million 
                                                 
12 See appendix A for an example of the choice experiment question as it was used in the questionnaire. 
13 According to Louviere (1988), main effects explain between 70% and 90% of respondent behaviour. The efficiency of the 
fractional factorial designs has not been explicitly evaluated. However, for the construction of the designs, we used the 
methodology described by Street et al. (2005). 
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residential customers, of which 2.7 million customers are Flemish residents (VREG 
(2013b)). 
In 2013, 12 distribution companies took care of electricity distribution in Flanders. 
Distribution companies are at least partially owned by the municipalities. In some 
distribution areas, the incumbent generator Electrabel is also involved. These latter 
distribution companies have joined their operational tasks in one coordinating company, 
Eandis, that is jointly owned by municipalities (79%) and Electrabel (21%). The 
distribution companies fully owned by municipalities have joined their operational tasks 
in another coordinating company, Infrax. 
Retail competition is allowed. In December 2012, 33 firms had a license to supply 
electricity to end-users, 14 of which also focused on the residential market. Not all 
retailers are actively supplying in all distribution areas, but all distribution companies 
have at least 10 active retailers in their area. In 2012, three suppliers had a market share 
of more than 10% (VREG (2013b)). Electrabel Customer Solutions is the largest player 
with a market share of 39.7%, coming from 48.1% in 2010. EDF Luminus with 20.5% 
and Electrabel NV with 16.2% are also in the top three. The latter firm only supplies to 
large companies and the government. Five firms have market shares of more than 1%, 
all other firms have lower market shares. 
Note that two of the three largest suppliers, Electrabel Customer Solutions and 
Electrabel NV, are controlled by GDF Suez. Nevertheless, concentration measures in 
the sector are improving. For example, in 2012 the HHI-index for the Flemish 
electricity retail sector was 3094, coming from 4595 in 2010. 
Two pricing schemes are used in the Flemish residential electricity market: a flat tariff 
and a time-of-use tariff. Survey results indicate that the TOU market share is steadily 
increasing
14
, reaching 49.5% in 2011 (VREG (2011)). Electricity consumption is being 
registered once per year by the metering company, either via a visit from a company 
representative or via self-reporting by the household. Electricity bills are sent out every 
three months, based on expected expenses for the coming year after the last meter 
reading. In the last quarter of the billing period, a final bill is presented, based on the 
actual or reported meter reading. Remarkably, the survey results also mention that more 
than 45% of households have no idea of their level of electricity consumption 
(measured in kWh). Moreover, about 20% of households do not check electricity bills. 
Smart metering initiatives in the Flemish electricity market 
The introduction of smart meters in Belgium has been stalled because of contradictory 
outcomes of economic cost-benefit analyses in the regions. A first cost-benefit analysis 
for the Flemish market showed a negative business case (Schrijner et al. (2008)). The 
analysis was updated in 2011 (Schrijner et al. (2011)), resulting in a slightly positive 
business case for a complete rollout. In both cases, the same framework and model was 
used. The switch from a negative to a positive business case was driven by parameter 
updates based on new information. To date, Flanders did not take a formal decision 
regarding the introduction of smart meters yet, but the topic is expected to stay high on 
the agenda of most stakeholders. 
                                                 
14 About 5% of residential customers also have a separate meter and a corresponding flat tariff for electricity consumption during 
the night. This tariff applies to customers using particular types of electrical heating and is usually combined with a TOU tariff 
for non-heating related electricity consumption. 
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Eandis and Infrax initiated and finalised some small scale pilot projects, with a specific 
focus on technical testing, both of the meters and the communication technology
15
. As 
of October 2012, both companies started with installing about 50.000 smart meters at 
representative locations in Flanders (urban and rural areas, apartments…). The 
outcomes of this latter project allow to update previous findings that were based on the 
small scale pilot studies. In March 2014, another update of the CBA study was made, 
based upon these newly collected data. The conclusion of this study was that the 
business case for a mandatory and full rollout still is negative (VREG (2014)). 
The Flemish energy regulator VREG annually publishes a so-called Market Monitor 
based on a survey conducted on 1000 Flemish residential customers. The questionnaire 
also includes a few questions on the consumer’s interest in, perception of and attitude 
about smart meters. In the survey, a smart meter is defined as a device that registers 
energy use in detail and that provides faster, better and more frequent information about 
usage
16
. The question is asked whether the respondent would be interested in receiving 
a smart metering device from their distribution company. Summarizing, VREG (2012) 
and VREG (2013a) report that females, younger cohorts, respondents with more 
educational background and employed respondents show more interest in smart meters 
than their complementary counterparts. 
Finally, VREG (2012) also reports that about 18% of the respondents consider a smart 
meter as described above as an invasion of privacy. Also, 71% of respondents strongly 
opposes to the possibility of a temporary interruption of power supply. Of the remaining 
fraction, 26% accepts a temporary partial interruption of supply and 2% would accept a 
temporary full power cut. 
3.2. Description and preparation of the data 
The analysis in this paper is based on a survey covering 287 households. For some 
households the data could not be used due to missing or inaccurate data, mainly 
regarding the size of the electricity bill. Cleaning up the responses resulted in a dataset 
containing 228 households. As explained before, two blocks of 9 choice sets were 
constructed, the first block was evaluated by 116 respondents, the second block by 112 
respondents. Data collection took place in the first semester of 2011 via a web-based 
survey
17
. 
The purpose was to carry out an explorative study and to gather information about 
preferences regarding smart metering devices, both from individuals with a revealed 
interest in electricity products and services and from individuals without apparent 
interest in these products and services. As it was conjectured that younger, well-
educated households and/or households living in relatively new houses would show 
more interest in smart meters, we decided to aim at an oversampling of younger and 
middle aged cohorts. A strict budgetary constraint imposed by the client firm made us 
decide to use the snowball sampling technique to collect the data. The survey was 
launched in two ways. First, a link to the survey was emailed to an extensive list of 
                                                 
15 See http://www.linear-smartgrid.be for a brief description of one of the small scale pilot projects in Hombeek, Leest and Bret-
Gelieren. 
16 Note that, compared to the definition of a smart meter used in this paper, the VREG-definition is rather broad, with incomplete 
reference to potential benefits and costs that might be related to using the device. 
17 For a comparison and discussion of face-to-face and web surveys, we refer to Nielsen (2010). This author concludes that, for his 
study, the mean and median WTP values are statistically indistinguishable for both survey modes, despite the fact that response 
rates and other validation criteria can differ significantly. 
   12 
contacts collected by the stakeholders involved (relatives, friends, acquaintances). Most 
of these contacts had no apparent interest in electricity products or services. Second, a 
link to the survey was posted on three websites that are primarily visited by people 
interested in energy issues, products and services. 
Clearly, snowball sampling has a number of deficiencies of which sample selection bias 
is probably the most important one. The selection of the sample is not random and one 
can therefore not make general claims based on this particular sample. However, a 
major advantage in the context of the current study was the low cost involved in using a 
snowball sample. Moreover, as the snowballs began with the researchers and as 
respondents were either acquainted with energy or with one of the researchers, the 
response rate and the willingness to participate in further redistributing the survey link 
was quite high. 
The survey had three parts. The first part collected information on the respondent’s 
knowledge and attitudes about smart metering. These questions helped to prepare the 
respondent for the choice experiment and the answers were used to construct a variable 
that measures a respondent’s level of knowledge regarding smart metering. This 
variable was used as a covariate in the mixed logit model. The second part of the survey 
contained the choice experiment. As discussed, the choice experiment was kept fairly 
simple and straightforward and we therefore did not expect too much difficulties for 
respondents to answer these questions
18
. Finally, in the third part of the survey we 
collected information on some relevant socio-demographic characteristics such as 
household size, education and household income level. 
Table 2 summarizes some descriptive statistics for the cleaned database and the 
corresponding values for the Flemish population. Clearly, respondents younger than 35 
are overrepresented in the sample. Also, the average level of education and, 
consequently, the net monthly income level is higher in the sample than in the Flemish 
population. This is what we expected and in order to (partially) control for their effects, 
we include some socio-demographic covariates as control variables in the estimations. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
As expected – due to the overrepresentation of high income households – the average 
electricity bill in our sample (€1087) is higher than the average bill according to the 
Household Budget Survey 2012 (€836)19. We did not collect data on actual electricity 
consumption (expressed in kWh). However, based on an annual survey, the Flemish 
regulator reports an average household electricity consumption of 3983 kWh in 2011 
(VREG (2012)). This average consumption covers all Flemish households, irrespective 
of their tariff scheme. Jespers et al. (2012) report Flemish survey data on average 
residential electricity consumption per type of housing. Using weights based on the type 
of housing, a weighted average annual electricity consumption of 3942 kWh was found 
which is close to the average consumption reported by VREG (2012). Given the higher 
                                                 
18 Appendix B presents a description of the 18 choice sets and the frequencies with which every profile was chosen in every choice 
set. 
19 See http://statbel.fgov.be/nl/statistieken/gegevensinzameling/enquetes/huishoudbudget/. Only available in Dutch or French. 
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electricity bill in our sample, we can conjecture that the average level of electricity 
consumption in our sample is above the Flemish average
20
. 
The Federal Energy Regulator CREG regularly reports on the evolution of the cost of 
energy (electricity and gas) for standard consumers. One type of standard consumer is a 
4-person
21
 household consuming 3500 kWh per year (1600kWh daytime/1900kWh 
during the night and weekend) subject to a TOU pricing scheme. Early 2011, this 
standard customer would, given market conditions at that time and depending on the 
distribution area and the supplier, be paying an overall average price per kWh between 
€0.160 and €0.210. 
Familiarity with the technology 
A respondents’ familiarity with the smart metering technology was assessed based on 
the self-reported level of knowledge of smart grids and smart homes. Two questions 
were asked at the start of the survey: ‘how would you describe your knowledge of smart 
grids’? and ‘how would you describe your knowledge of smart homes’? Both questions 
were preceded by a brief description of the main features of a smart grid or smart home. 
Answers on both questions were provided on a 4 point scale (extensive, good, poor, 
none) and were then combined into one variable. Respondents with extensive or good 
knowledge of either smart grids or smart homes were classified as having ‘good prior 
knowledge’, respondents with poor or no knowledge of both smart grids and smart 
homes were classified as having ‘no prior knowledge’. All others were classified as 
respondents with ‘some prior knowledge’. In this way, 14% of respondents is classified 
as having good prior knowledge, 79.4% is classified as having ‘no prior knowledge’ and 
6.6% is classified as having ‘some prior knowledge’. The level of knowledge seems to 
depend on age but not on income. About 68% of respondents younger than 36 were 
classified as having no prior knowledge, increasing to 78% and 92% in the medium age 
class and 50 plus age class, respectively. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Only 8 respondents made use of some kind of smart metering application in their house. 
One question measured the extent to which respondents are interested in the different 
capabilities of a smart meter (measuring standby consumption, consumption per device, 
timing of consumption, automated response to real-time prices). The results are 
summarized in Table 3. Overall, a majority of respondents showed positive and fairly 
stable interest in the capabilities of smart meters: 18% to 24% is not or moderately 
interested, 45% to 55% is highly or extremely interested. 
                                                 
20 We could also estimate average electricity consumption in our sample by dividing the bill by the average price per kWh. 
However, such a calculation would require information on the share of households in the sample paying a flat rate or a TOU rate, 
respectively. We do not have this information. Moreover, this approach would be further complicated by the fact that flat and 
TOU rates tend to differ substantially between distribution areas. 
21 In Flanders, households receive a rebate (known as free electricity) that depends on household size. This rebate equals 
 Number of household members 1 100 pricekWhkWh    and was taken 
into account in the calculation. In practice, the cost of this rebate is socialized via the distribution tariff. 
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4. Estimation results 
It has been described in the literature (for example Rose and Bliemer (2009)) that 
optimal orthogonal designs may stimulate apparent lexicographic choice behaviour, 
particularly when dominant attribute levels are used. As explained before, this might be 
the case with the cost savings attribute in our choice experiment. Such behaviour would 
manifest trough a systematic choice of the alternative that ranks best on that attribute, 
irrespective of the other attributes shown in the choice set. Lexicographic choice 
behaviour could also manifest through a repeated selection of the status quo option 
(non-participation) or through a number of other reasons, such as simplifying strategies 
or heuristics, ethical reasoning or actual lexicographic preferences (Campbell et al. 
(2008), Sælensminde (2006)). Lancsar and Louviere (2006) argue that, as lexicographic 
choices do not necessarily represent lexicographic preferences, deleting observations 
based on what appears to be lexicographic choice behaviour might lead to biased 
results. They therefore advice to be cautious when considering deleting responses from 
discrete choice experiments based on the alleged presence of irrational choice 
behaviour. If researchers have doubt regarding the rationality of choices stated by some 
respondents, then they advise to at least present the models estimated with the data in 
and out of the model. Data should only be removed from the dataset if there is strong 
theoretical and empirical evidence to do so. 
Following their advice, we present estimates for the CL model with and without 
observations of respondents showing non-compensatory behaviour and then test 
whether the results are different
22
. We define apparent lexicographic responses as 
responses where the respondent has consistently chosen the alternative with the ‘best 
level’ for a given attribute (Ryan and Bate (2001), Rulleau and Dachary-Bernard 
(2012)). For the monetary attributes, apparent lexicographic preferences were identified 
when higher (lower) values for the cost savings (investment cost) attribute were 
consistently preferred above lower (higher) values in all choice sets. For the qualitative 
attributes, responses were identified as apparently lexicographic when the respondent 
consistently preferred the alternative with the same level in all choice sets (if that level 
was present in the choice set). Non-participation is identified as consistently preferring 
the status quo alternative above any other alternative offered in all evaluated choice sets 
(Hess et al. (2010)). 
Unsurprisingly, we found indications of apparent lexicographic choices in the cost 
savings attribute as 29 out of the 228 respondents systematically chose the alternative 
with the highest level of cost savings. We did not find indications of lexicographic 
choice behaviour for the other attributes. Non-trading behaviour was found in the stated 
choices of 12 respondents. 
4.1. The conditional logit model 
Table 4 shows results for the main effects CL model without socio-demographic 
interactions, i.e. the following specification was estimated: 
 ASC k k Iit SQ it it it
k
U ASC X I       .  (12) 
                                                 
22 An alternative to dropping respondents from the sample is to treat preference discontinuity parametrically by adjusting the 
statistical model. See Campbell et al. (2008), Campbell et al. (2011), Scarpa et al. (2013) and Hole (2011) for examples of this 
approach. 
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Qualitative attribute variables are effects coded
23
. Effects variables corresponding to the 
current situation, i.e. the status quo  SQ  alternative, are all set equal to zero. In the 
non-status quo alternatives, reference levels for the categorical attributes (see Table 1) 
are indicated by -1. The presence or absence of non-reference levels is indicated by 1 
and 0, respectively. As a result ASC , the parameter related to the alternative specific 
constant in the status quo alternative, captures the value of the current metering device 
and the effects of attributes and socio-demographic covariates not included in the 
model
24
. A negative value would indicate that respondents prefer to move away from 
the status quo, a positive value would indicate conservative preferences from the part of 
the respondent. 
The CL model serves as reference for the RPL model discussed in section 4.2. Three 
versions of the CL model were estimated. The first model is based on the full sample of 
228 households, the second model excludes respondents showing lexicographic choice 
behavior and the third model excludes both lexicographic and non-trading responses. 
The first thing to note is that all significantly estimated coefficients have the expected 
sign. Significant estimates in model 1 remain significant in model 2 and model 3. In 
model 2 and model 3, two additional variables become significant: Comfort level 1 and 
Visibility level 1. Furthermore, the null-hypothesis of having a zero ASC -coefficient is 
rejected in model 3. We reject the hypothesis that the estimates of model 1 are the same 
as those of the models 2 and 3, respectively
25
. The hypothesis that the estimates in 
model 2 are equal to those in model 3 cannot be rejected. We therefore decided to 
continue with model 3 to calculate WTP values. The model performance in terms of the 
pseudo- 2R  is lowest in model 2 and is comparable in model 1 and model 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The impact on utility of the percentage of ‘cost savings’ is assumed to be linear. A 
quadratic specification was also tested, but resulted in a non-significant parameter (at 
the 5% level) for the quadratic term and did not significantly increase the explanatory 
power of the models. With the linear specification we find a very significant positive 
impact of the Cost Savings attribute on the respondent’s utility. Only some qualitative 
attributes of the smart metering devices are found to have a significant effect on 
household utility. As mentioned before, we distinguish four qualitative characteristics: 
impact on comfort and privacy, and visibility and functionality of the device. Starting 
with the impact on comfort and focusing on CL model 3 we find that ‘shifting of 
services over time’ has a significant impact on utility, an effect that was not found in 
model 1. However, interventions that would result in a decreased level of comfort (e.g. 
                                                 
23 Using effects coding allows to easily reconstruct the effects of the reference cases (
0 ) as  0 1 2     . 
24 We include only one alternative-specific constant. Alternatively, two alternative-specific constants could have been added, one 
for each non-status quo alternative. However, we imposed from the start the constraint that 1 2
C C  , which is equivalent to 
only including ASC . 
25 LR value models 1 and 2: 2 293.06; 0.000p   ,  LR value models 1 and 3: 2 38.82; 0.000p   , 
both with 11 d.f.. 
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turning down the thermostat) are evaluated significantly negative in the three CL 
models. 
Households have a preference for smart metering devices that do more than simply 
providing information about consumption (i.e. monitoring) , although a very dynamic 
management of household appliances is not preferred. This outcome is found in all CL 
models. 
Households clearly are concerned about the privacy impact of the smart metering 
equipment. A transfer of information towards the distribution company is disliked, 
especially when this would be combined with allowing the distribution company to take 
autonomous measures. 
The last qualitative characteristic of the smart meter is visibility. In the models 2 and 3, 
households dislike devices that are visible, an effect that is not found in model 1. 
Finally, the investment cost of the smart metering device has a significant and negative 
impact on household utility, indicating, as can be expected, that higher investment 
outlays for the metering device are disliked. 
As always, the impact of each of these attributes has to be evaluated relative to the 
reference situation, which is a ‘standard’ metering device, implying the comfort, 
functionality, visibility and privacy conditions at the time the survey was filled out, with 
no cost savings relative to the current electricity bill and a zero additional investment 
requirement for the metering device. The value of the current situation is captured by 
the alternative-specific constant parameter and is negative in model 3, indicating that 
respondents have a preference towards smart metering devices. 
Marginal WTP values based on the conditional logit model 
As explained in section 2.2, the estimation results can be used to calculate marginal 
WTP values. These WTP values express the value of a change away from the current 
situation. We thus take the current (status quo) situation as the reference case for the 
WTP calculation, allowing to calculate WTP values as shown in equation (11)
26
. All 
three CL models generate very similar WTP results (except for the ASC). Therefore, 
Table 5 only shows the results for WTP values derived from model 3 estimates. 
Respondents are willing to pay approximately €200 to move away from the standard 
metering equipment (all attribute levels are equal to zero) to a smart metering device. 
The null-hypothesis that this WTP equals zero is rejected (95% significance). 
Respondents also value cost savings: a one percentage point of savings on the annual 
electricity bill is valued €14. Respondents are willing to pay €109 for a device that has 
no impact on comfort, while the willingness to pay for devices that only allow load 
shifting is just statistically significant at the 10% level. A smart meter that would reduce 
comfort levels by reacting on price signals (e.g. by turning the thermostat lower) is 
valued negatively, i.e. households are willing to pay €153 to avoid having a smart meter 
with this particular characteristic installed. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
26 Calculating WTP values relative to the reference level of the attribute (see Table 1), would require another expression. 
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Smart meter functionality does not seem to influence its value very much. The results 
suggest that devices that can be programmed to autonomously shut down electrical 
appliances (for example a TV, when it is in ‘stand by’ modus for too long) are valued 
positively. On the other hand, respondents are neutral regarding smart metering devices 
that can respond dynamically to changing price signals. Devices with limited 
functionality, i.e. only monitoring and displaying electricity consumption levels of 
electric appliances, tend to be valued negatively. 
Privacy characteristics have a large impact on the value of smart metering devices. 
Respondents are willing to pay about €160 for a device that has no privacy impact at all. 
Devices that would allow the distribution company to autonomously steer consumption 
are valued extremely negative. Respondents are willing to pay €155 to avoid such a 
device. 
Finally, the visibility of the devices also seems to be of concern to the respondents. 
Devices installed on the wall are valued negatively. One is willing to pay €71 to avoid 
visibility of the devices. 
4.2. The mixed logit model 
In the mixed logit model, it is assumed that households have heterogeneous preferences 
regarding all characteristics of the smart metering technology. An exception is made for 
the bill attribute in order not to complicate the estimation of the willingness to pay 
values (Hensher and Greene (2003)). All random parameters are assumed to follow a 
normal distribution, except for the cost savings attribute which is assumed to follow a 
lognormal distribution. This latter distribution makes sense when a random parameter is 
expected to be either in the positive or the negative domain. 
Similar to the approach followed in the previous section, we focus on estimating main 
effects. In addition, we also consider age, income and prior knowledge of the smart 
metering technology as explanatory variables. As noted before, our sample is biased 
towards younger and higher income respondents. We control for this by including age 
and income as explanatory variables and conjecture that age and income might impact 
preferences regarding smart metering devices via the cost savings attribute in the choice 
experiment
27
. The level of prior knowledge (see section 3.2) is interacted with the 
alternative specific constant. Here, we conjecture that if being more or less informed 
about the smart metering devices has an impact on preferences, then this will show up 
via more or less conservative choices. Equation (5) describes the mixed logit model. 
The random effects are assumed uncorrelated over the attributes. 
The RPL estimates in Table 6 are based on the sample of 187 respondents, i.e. 
excluding both lexicographic and non-trading responses. The first thing to note is that 
the null hypothesis of a zero status-quo effect cannot be rejected. However, a 
significantly negative effect is found for respondents having a high knowledge level, 
indicating that these respondents are significantly more inclined to adopt a smart 
metering technology. In terms of significance and sign of the attribute parameters, the 
RPL and CL (model 3) estimates are very similar. The hypothesis of zero preference 
                                                 
27 We also interacted the age classes with the qualitative attributes of the devices, but, except for the interaction of age with privacy 
(negative sign) these variables were all non-significant.  
Numerous models including other socio-demographic covariates as interaction variables were also estimated, with limited 
success. In this paper, we therefore only report outcomes for a model including age and income as interacted covariates. 
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parameters for the income and age interaction variables cannot be rejected except for 
the low income group and the medium age group. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Note that in the CL model the attribute parameters reflect preference information 
assuming homogenous preferences over households whereas in the RPL model these 
values provide an estimate of the mean of the distribution of preferences over 
households. Where a normal distribution of the preference parameter was assumed, the 
RPL estimates imply that a fraction of the respondents has preferences of opposite sign 
as the estimated sign of the preference mean. Thus, the estimate of the mean preference 
should be evaluated together with the estimate of the standard deviation of the 
preference distribution. These latter estimates are listed below the estimates of the 
mean. 
Cost saving 
The cost savings parameter follows a lognormal distribution. The estimated parameters 
shown in Table 6 are the mean and standard deviation of the natural logarithm of the 
cost savings coefficient. The mean and the standard deviation of the cost savings 
coefficient itself are 0.0695 and 0.1113, respectively. Both are significant at the 1% 
level. Also note that preferences for cost savings are lower for respondents in the low 
income class and respondents of medium age
28
. 
Comfort 
Households have homogeneous preferences w.r.t. a rescheduling of services over time. 
The parameter estimate of the mean is positive and significant at the 5% level. This is 
not the case when the comfort level would reduce due to a reduction of the quality of 
the services provided: respondents strongly dislike this feature. Moreover, the 
hypothesis of homogeneous preferences cannot be rejected. These results are in line 
with the findings obtained with the conditional logit model. 
Functionality 
Smart metering devices that monitor electricity consumption and can be programmed to 
autonomously shut down unused electrical appliances (for example appliances in ‘stand 
by’ modus) are valued positively. Preferences for devices that can autonomously 
intervene based on price information are on average not valued. Again, these result are 
in line with the outcome of the conditional logit model. For both levels of functionality 
we cannot reject the hypothesis of preference homogeneity.  
Privacy 
A large share of households dislikes reduced privacy levels. Regarding the intermediate 
privacy impact (information regarding the electricity load profile is transmitted to the 
distribution company), average preferences seem to be close to neutral, but the estimate 
of the standard deviation suggests that preferences are heterogeneous. Overall, this 
                                                 
28 The income variable is categorical and distinguishes three classes: ‘low income’ (net monthly household income less than or 
equal to €2500), ‘medium income’ (net monthly incomes between €2501 and €4000) and ‘high income’ (net monthly incomes 
above €4000). The ‘income not available’ category is taken as the reference category. 
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implies that close to 50% of households do not oppose to the idea of having load 
information transferred to the distribution company. 
The conclusion is different when the distribution company would be able to 
autonomously steer electricity demand. Here, the average household has a clear 
disutility, although preferences are heterogeneous. About 80% of households dislikes 
this type of smart metering. 
Visibility 
Respondents seem to have heterogeneous preferences with regard to the visibility 
aspects of the smart metering device. About 80% of respondents dislike having the 
equipment devices installed on the wall (i.e. on the electricity socket, therefore visible). 
Preferences are more neutral and homogeneous regarding the option of having metering 
devices installed in the electrical appliances. 
Investment cost 
Finally, the investment cost attribute is – as expected, and in line with the results of the 
CL model – negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Marginal willingness to pay based on the mixed logit model 
Following a similar approach as with the CL model, we generate WTP estimates for the 
RPL model. Using equation (11) we find the results summarized in Table 7. Note that 
these WTP values are estimates for the ‘average household’ within that group. Upper 
and lower bounds should be interpreted as a 95% confidence interval for this estimate 
and should not be interpreted as the range of WTP values that emerges as a consequence 
of the heterogeneity of preferences. The latter interval would be wider, because of the 
estimated variation in preferences. 
The negative WTP linked to the alternative-specific constant reflects the respondent’s 
willingness to move away from the status quo (ASC=1 for the standard meter). 
Respondents with better prior knowledge of smart applications show an even higher 
willingness to move towards a smart metering device. Clearly, having prior knowledge 
about smart metering has a positive impact in the willingness to adopt the technology. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
The mean WTP for one percentage point savings on the annual electricity bill is 
statistically significant at the 1% level and equals €30 for a respondent younger than 36 
with unknown monthly household income. Taking into account age and income, the 
WTP ranges between €18 and €36. All values are statistically significant but, in our 
sample, we do not find statistical evidence to support the hypothesis that the WTP for 
an extra percentage point of cost savings depends on age or income. 
These results allow to derive the household’s implicit rate of time preference for money. 
For example, according to the Belgian Household Budget Survey of 2012 (see footnote 
15), a respondent with average household income (€3900) has an annual electricity bill 
of approximately €850. Assuming that this respondent is aged 36 to 50, a one 
percentage point of cost savings would imply an annual reduction in the electricity bill 
of €8.5. With a WTP of €29 (a one-time payment) for one percent of cost savings on the 
annual electricity bill and assuming an infinite time horizon, this implies a discount rate 
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of 8.5 29 29.3% . Note that with a WTP of €29, assuming shorter time horizons 
would hardly make any difference in terms of implied discount rate. For example with a 
10 year time horizon, the implied discount rate would equal 26,5%. 
According to our results, a respondent aged between 36 and 50 with a household 
income in the low income class is willing to pay €18 for a 1% cost savings on the 
annual electricity bill. Based on the Belgian Household Budget Survey, we estimate the 
annual electricity bill at around €700 for this income class. Taking this value as an 
approximation, the implicit discount rate for this respondent would be 7 /18 38.9%  
(37.3%, with a 10-year time horizon). A respondent older than 50 in the high income 
class would spend approximately €1000 on electricity. Assuming a willingness to pay of 
€32 for a 1% cost savings, the implicit discount rate would be 10 32 31.3%  (28.8%, 
with a 10-year lifetime horizon). 
Looking at the qualitative characteristics of the smart metering device, we see that the 
CL and RP models generate quite similar results, at least in terms of the order of 
magnitude or the WTP values. We find a significantly positive mean WTP for a device 
that allows monitoring and can autonomously shut down appliances (functionality). 
Furthermore, the average respondent has a significantly negative willingness to pay to 
avoid a metering device that allows for reduced energy service levels (comfort), for 
external intervention by the distribution company (privacy) or is installed on the wall 
(visibility). 
Willingness to pay for a smart metering device 
From a purely financial perspective, the implied internal rates of return of the devices 
offered in the choice experiment are extremely high, ranging from 23% for the most 
expensive device (costing €350), resulting in an annual saving on the electricity bill of 
€80 (10% on €800, the average electricity bill in Flanders) over an infinity time horizon, 
up to 480% for the cheapest device (costing €100) and resulting in an annual cost saving 
on the bill of 60%. This means that, from a purely financial perspective given and given 
an implicit discount rate of approximately 29%, most devices offered in the experiment 
are worth buying. 
However, the impact on privacy and comfort, and the visibility and functionality 
features of the devices will also affect the value for the consumer. In Table 8, we 
therefore calculate the value for the customer of moving from a standard meter to a 
smart meter with the features described in the table. The customer is assumed to be a 
reference customer in the sense that he values a 1% of cost savings on the annual 
electricity bill at 30€. The first meter is a very basic one that monitors electricity 
consumption, is installed on the wall and results in an annual reduction of the electricity 
bill of 3%. Respondents without prior knowledge of smart applications are willing to 
pay just over €300 for this device if, in addition, it has no impact on comfort and 
privacy. If the device would have a small impact on comfort levels, for example because 
using the washing machine is shifted to the evening, and load information is 
communicated to a third party, then the value of the smart meter reduces to €38. If this 
third party could also actively intervene, then the value of the device becomes negative, 
i.e. the respondent is willing to pay to avoid the device. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE. 
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All other devices in the table, are identical to this basic device except for one or two 
features, relating to the percentage of cost saving, the functionality or the visibility of 
the device. From the table, we learn that the more advanced a smart meter becomes in 
terms of automated response or third party intervention (and thus privacy impact) the 
less it is valued by the respondents. The amount of cost savings that can be realised then 
becomes crucial to assess its market potential. However, evidence from pilot studies 
suggests that these savings are likely to be insufficient to compensate for this. 
According to Giordano et al. (2013), 3% would be a conservative estimate of cost 
savings, but results for 7% of cost savings are also presented. Both levels are 
insufficient to compensate for a large privacy impact. Another, element with positive 
impact on the valuation of a smart meter is the level of prior knowledge, as can be seen 
by comparing the first and the third block in Table 8. However, this effect in itself 
seems insufficient to compensate the negative contributions to the value of a smart 
meter that are due to privacy and comfort effects. Well-informed consumers and an 
invisible installation (block 6) are required to at least obtain a positive valuation of a 
smart metering device with large impact in comfort and privacy, let alone to have a 
value that outweighs the investment cost of the device. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper tackles the question of whether and to what extent households are willing to 
pay for smart metering devices with varying characteristics. The data were collected in 
Flanders via a choice experiment in which smart meters are described by their 
investment cost, their cost savings potential, and their effect on comfort, functionality, 
privacy and visibility. Respondents showing lexicographic choice or non-trading 
behaviour were removed from the dataset. The data were used to estimate a main effects 
conditional logit model and a main effects random parameter logit model, the latter 
including interaction effects to control for age, income and prior knowledge of smart 
metering technology. 
As our sample is not representative for the Flemish population, one cannot simply 
generalize the results to that population, let alone to other regions or countries. 
Nevertheless, the results show that households in our sample do value the different 
characteristics of smart metering devices. We also find support for the hypothesis that 
preferences for some of these attributes are heterogeneous (for the ‘cost savings 
potential’, ‘privacy impact’ and ‘visibility’). Taking into account preference 
heterogeneity and the presence of non-trading behaviour, we do not find evidence for a 
status quo effect for respondents with little prior knowledge of smart technologies. 
Respondents with good prior knowledge of smart technologies have a clear preference 
to move away from the standard metering device installed in their homes. 
From a policy perspective, the results are interesting as they suggest that a sizeable 
proportion households might be reluctant to voluntarily switch to a smart meter. Unless 
a smart meter is equipped with features and characteristics that support consumer 
engagement, it might not create the potential benefits it is claimed to create. From a 
household’s perspective, the private value of the device, taking into account its main 
characteristics, is too low to justify the investment. Even with a mandatory roll-out it is 
not clear whether households will be willing to take full advantage of the device. 
Realising the full social and private benefits linked to the devices would require 
households to switch to an electricity contract that involves dynamic pricing, with 
automated and/or third party control of electric appliances in their homes (Faruqui et al. 
(2010), Giordano et al. (2013)). These are exactly the features that receive lowest (or 
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even negative) value in our study. The results thus suggest that it would not be a good 
idea, from a policy perspective, to organize a mandatory roll-out of the technology, at 
least not without first tackling the issues that are negatively valued by the respondents. 
One element in the solution to this problem could be the provision of information to the 
customer. Indeed, our results also suggest that providing sufficient information to the 
public about the benefits and costs of ‘smart technologies’ could help to increase the 
market potential of the devices. 
As mentioned before, our sample is not representative. Nevertheless, our results suggest 
(an thereby are in line with the conclusion by Stromback et al. (2011)) that the design of 
a mart metering device can have a large impact on how much of its potential to initiate 
demand response c an be exploited. The design of the devices thus needs careful 
attention before deciding on its roll-out but further analysis on larger and representative 
samples is needed for this. 
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Appendix A : The choice experiment question 
The section containing the choice experiment questions starts with the following 
introduction, followed by a description of all attributes and the corresponding levels. 
The nine choice questions are then presented one by one. They all comprise a table 
similar to the table below and a brief attribute description. 
Introductory screen 
In the following nine questions you must select one out of three available options. Option 1 and 
Option 2 each represent a smart home application that reduces energy consumption at your 
home. An application has six major properties. Please select the application that you prefer. If 
you prefer neither option, then choose the current situation (option 3). 
1. Investment cost (to be paid once): €100, €200 or €300. 
2. Functionality of the application: 
a. Monitoring: provides information on energy use for all electrical applications, at 
any moment of the day. 
b. Monitoring and (dis)connection: monitoring + disconnecting electrical 
appliances (for example applications in stand-by modus). 
c. Dynamic management of appliances: energy price information can be used to 
start up or stop electrical appliances. 
3. Visibility: 
a. In the wall: the device is integrated in the power outlet. 
b. On the wall: the device is installed on the wall. 
c. In electrical appliances: the device is integrated in electrical appliances. 
4. Impact on privacy: 
a. None: no impact on privacy 
b. Information is communicated to network operator; 
c. Information is communicated to the network operator and third party 
intervention is possible (for example in case of an imminent power outage or 
grid overload). 
5. Impact on comfort: 
a. None: no impact on the perceived comfort level. 
b. Shifting of load in time: for example, the application can autonomously decide 
to run the washing machine during the night. 
c. Reduced comfort level: for example, the application can autonomously decide 
to change the in-house temperature. 
6. Cost saving: annual reduction of the electricity bill obtained via the application 
a. 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50% or 60% 
In each of the presented choice sets, select the option you prefer. 
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Example of one choice experiment question 
Which option do you prefer? 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Investment cost €100 €200 Current situation 
Functionality Monitoring Monitoring and disconnection  
Visibility of the installation In the wall On the wall  
Privacy No impact Information is transmitted  
Loss of comfort None Shift applications in time  
Cost savings 10% 20%  
    
 Option 1 
 
Option 2 
 
Option 3 
 
Brief description of the attributes 
- Investment cost: on-time payment to get the smart home application in your house. 
- Functionality: the different functions that the smart home application has. 
- Visibility: how is the application integrated in your house? 
- Privacy: the extent to which third parties have access to information about your energy 
consumption. 
- Comfort: the extent to which the application affects your comfort level. 
- Cost saving: annual reduction of the electricity bill obtained via the application. 
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Appendix B : Description of the choice sets and the choice frequencies. 
Survey Choice card Profile invCost Funct Visib Privacy Comfort 
Cost 
Savings 
Frequency 
1 1 1 100 0 0 0 0 0.1 43,1% 
1 1 2 200 1 1 1 1 0.2 48,3% 
1 1 3 Status Quo 8,6% 
1 2 1 200 2 2 0 1 0.2 47,8% 
1 2 2 350 0 0 1 2 0.3 40,8% 
1 2 3 Status Quo 11,3% 
1 3 1 350 1 2 1 0 0.3 25,9% 
1 3 2 100 2 0 2 1 0.4 53,6% 
1 3 3 Status Quo 20,5% 
1 4 1 200 1 0 2 2 0.4 22,0% 
1 4 2 350 2 1 0 0 0.5 66,1% 
1 4 3 Status Quo 11,9% 
1 5 1 350 0 0 2 1 0.5 15,9% 
1 5 2 100 1 2 0 2 0.6 71,0% 
1 5 3 Status Quo 13,1% 
1 6 1 100 2 1 1 2 0.6 64,1% 
1 6 2 200 0 2 2 0 0.1 12,3% 
1 6 3 Status Quo 23,6% 
1 7 1 200 1 1 1 1 0.1 28,3% 
1 7 2 350 2 2 2 2 0.2 33,7% 
1 7 3 Status Quo 33,0% 
1 8 1 350 0 0 1 2 0.2 12,5% 
1 8 2 100 1 1 2 0 0.3 62,5% 
1 8 3 Status Quo 25,0% 
1 9 1 100 2 0 2 1 0.3 28,8% 
1 9 2 200 0 1 0 2 0.4 59,6% 
1 9 3 Status Quo 11,6% 
2 1 1 350 2 1 0 0 0.4 31,3% 
2 1 2 100 0 2 1 1 0.5 58,9% 
2 1 3 Status Quo 9,8% 
2 2 1 100 1 2 0 2 0.5 29,7% 
2 2 2 200 2 0 1 0 0.6 56,8% 
2 2 3 Status Quo 13,5% 
2 3 1 200 0 2 2 0 0.6 61,3% 
2 3 2 350 1 0 0 1 0.1 21,6% 
2 3 3 Status Quo 17,1% 
2 4 1 350 2 2 2 2 0.1 6,5% 
2 4 2 100 0 0 0 0 0.2 81,4% 
2 4 3 Status Quo 12,1% 
2 5 1 100 1 1 2 0 0.2 18,7% 
2 5 2 200 2 2 0 1 0.3 64,5% 
2 5 3 Status Quo 16,8% 
2 6 1 200 0 1 0 2 0.3 17,8% 
2 6 2 350 1 2 1 0 0.4 63,5% 
2 6 3 Status Quo 18,7% 
2 7 1 100 0 2 1 1 0.4 29,9% 
2 7 2 200 1 0 2 2 0.5 46,7% 
2 7 3 Status Quo 23,4% 
2 8 1 200 2 0 1 0 0.5 41,1% 
2 8 2 350 0 1 2 1 0.6 38,3% 
2 8 3 Status Quo 20,6% 
2 9 1 350 1 0 0 1 0.6 69,8% 
2 9 2 100 2 1 1 2 0.1 11,3% 
2 9 3 Status Quo 18,9% 
Table A.1: Basic frequencies responses per choice card. 
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Attribute Description Levels Nr of 
levels 
Investment cost (€) One-time payment to adopt the smart meter. The 
smart meter is sold as a package that allows to 
‘control’ up to six electrical appliances. 
€100, €200, €350. 3 
Cost Savings (% 
point annual bill) 
These devices result in reduced electricity demand. 
The size of this effect is however unknown. 
10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%. 6 
Comfort impact Depending on the type of actions taken by the 
device, the impact on the comfort level can range 
from negligible to substantial. 
- No impact (Reference level); 
- Load shifting from peak to off-peak with little 
impact on comfort; 
- Reduced comfort level. 
3 
Functionality The minimum service is simply monitoring of load. 
In addition, the device might be programmed by its 
owner to shut down unused devices and/or to 
autonomously act upon information regarding load 
or price. 
- Only monitoring. (Reference level); 
- Monitoring and (dis)connecting appliances; 
- Dynamic management of appliances. 
3 
Privacy impact The device might or might not transfer load data to 
third parties. Moreover, these third parties might be 
allowed to actively intervene by shifting or 
shedding load. 
- No effect (Reference level); 
- Load profile communicated to network operator; 
- Load profile communicated to network operator 
and intervention is possible. 
3 
Visibility The visual impact of the device. - In the wall (not visible) (Reference level); 
- On the wall (in socket, visible); 
- In appliances (not visible). 
3 
Table 1: Attributes and levels used in the choice experiment. 
 
Variable Name  Sample Flemish 
Population 
Sex Male 
Female 
76,2% 
23,8% 
49,4% 
50,6% 
Age distribution <35:  
36 to 49:  
 50:  
31,6% 
36,4% 
32,1% 
23,5% 
27,6% 
48,9% 
Education Secondary school:  
Higher education: 
17,1% 
82,9% 
67% 
33% 
Net monthly household income  €2500:  
€2501 - €4000:  
 €4001:  
Unknown:  
17,6% 
33,2% 
31,1% 
18,1% 
 
Annual electricity bill Average:  
std. deviation.  
€1087 
€1477 
€836 
Annual electricity consumption Average: -  4000 kWh 
Average flat rate (€/kWh)  -
a €0.209
b 
Average price when TOU pricing 
scheme applies (€/kWh) 
 -
a
 €0.160 – €0.210
c
 
a
: Our dataset does not allow to distinguish between households according to the type of tariff 
they subscribed to. 
b
: Calculated (weighted) price in the last quarter of 2010 for a standard household consumer (4 
people), consuming 3500kWh per year, taking into account the market shares of the incumbent 
and the main alternative supplier (CREG (2011)). 
c
: Calculated price range for main suppliers in the first quarter of 2011 for a standard household 
consumer (4 people), consuming 3500kWh per year (1900kWh night/weekend;1600kWh 
daytime) (CREG (2012)). 
Table 2:Some descriptive statistics. 
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Percentage Interested in…? 
 
measuring 
standby 
consumption 
measuring 
consumption 
per device 
the timing of 
consumption 
automated 
response to real 
time price 
the total 
package 
Not Interested 8,33 9,21 10,53 7,89 7,02 
Moderately 12,72 14,91 21,49 14,47 10,96 
Interested 25,00 28,07 27,19 30,26 27,63 
Highly Interested 33,33 32,89 29,39 29,39 31,14 
Extremely Interested 20,61 14,91 11,40 17,98 23,25 
Table 3: Interest in different capabilities of a smart meter (228 respondents). 
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  Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Attribute All obs St. err. Non-lex. Beh. St. err. 
Non-lex. Beh. 
& trading St. err. 
ASC3 -0,1000 0,1502 -0,1105 0,1641 -0,3977** 0,1772 
CostSavings 0,0309*** 0,0029 0,0242*** 0,0027 0,0272*** 0,0030 
Comfort       
Load Shifting, little impact 0,0542 0,0372 0,0819* 0,0421 0,0857* 0,0443 
Reduced comfort -0,2412*** 0,0469 -0,2832*** 0,0525 -0,2986*** 0,0533 
Functionality       
Monitoring and disconnection 0,0721** 0,0339 0,0851** 0,0394 0,0928** 0,0423 
Dynamic Management -0,0061 0,0375 0,0017 0,0434 -0,0097 0,0459 
Privacy       
Load profile communicated -0,0371 0,0435 -0,0080 0,0490 -0,0133 0,0512 
Load profile communicated and 
intervention possible -0,2799*** 0,0473 -0,2829*** 0,0524 -0,3006*** 0,0537 
Visibility       
On the wall -0,0684 0,0454 -0,1120** 0,0518 -0,1374** 0,0533 
In appliance 0,0032 0,0370 -0,0189 0,0422 -0,0129 0,0431 
InvCost -0,0016*** 0,0003 -0,0020*** 0,0004 -0,0019*** 0,0004 
Nr. Choice sets 5,865 
 
4,629 
 
4,305 
 Pseudo  0,133 
 
0,0911 
 
0,144 
 Nr. of clusters 228 
 
199 
 
187 
 Loglikelihood -1862 
 
-1541 
 
-1350 
 k 11 
 
11 
 
11 
 Table 4: Estimation of main effects for the Smart Meter Choice Experiment 
after deleting observations showing apparent lexicographic behavior and/or 
non-trading behavior 
 
 
 
 Low. Bound° WTP  Up. Bound° 
Alt. Spec. Constant -€365 -€204 ** -€44 
Cost savings €7 €14 *** €21 
Comfort    
No impact €49 €109 *** €169 
Load Shifting, little impact -€6 44 * €94 
Reduced comfort -€234 -€153 *** -€73 
Functionality    
Only monitoring -€93 -€43 * €7 
Monitoring and disconnection €1 48€ * €94 
Dynamic Management -€51 -€5 €41 
Privacy    
No effect €73 €161 *** €249 
Load profile is communicated -€59 -€7 €45 
Profile communicated, intervention possible -€234 -€155 *** -€74 
Visibility    
In the wall €19 €77 *** €136 
On the wall -€131 -€71 ** -€11 
In appliances -€50 -€7 €37 
° 95% Confidence interval, estimated with the Delta method. 
* 0.1p  ; ** 0.05p  ; *** 0.01p   
Table 5: WTP estimates derived from the CL model 3. 
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 Coefficient 
 St. Err %>0 
Alt. Spec. Constant  0,1604  0,2075  
 ASC_No Knowledge  -0,2593  0,1826  
 ASC_Well Informed  -0,7233 *** 0,2347  
Investment Outlay  -0,0023 *** 0,0004  
Cost savings  Mean -3,3023 *** 0,1435  
 
SD 1,1276 *** 0,1231  
 Age 36 -50  -0,0097 ** 0,0044  
 Age older than 50  0,0061  0,0045  
 Low income (   €2500)  -0,0176 *** 0,0061  
 Medium income (€2500 – €4000)  0,0074  0,005  
 High income (   €4000)  -0,0004  0,0053  
Comfort       
Load Shifting, little impact Mean 0,1176 ** 0,0583 100.0% 
 
SD 0,0119  0,3375  
Reduced comfort Mean -0,4040 *** 0,0709 1.1% 
 
SD 0,1772  0,172  
Functionality       
Monitoring Mean 0,1455 ** 0,0601 98.9% 
and disconnection SD 0,0631  0,2005  
Dynamic Management Mean -0,0387  0,0617 29.2% 
 
SD 0,0708  0,2684  
Privacy       
Load profile Mean -0,0252  0,0655 47.4% 
is communicated SD 0,3915 *** 0,0970  
Load profile communicated Mean -0,4005 *** 0,0744 18.0% 
and intervention possible SD 0,4373 *** 0,1026  
Visibility       
On the wall Mean -0,2065 *** 0,0691 21.8% 
 
SD 0,2647 ** 0,1154  
In appliances Mean -0,0042  0,0596 46.0% 
 
SD -0,0417  0,2162  
Statistics  
 
 
 
 
 N  4305  
 
 
 Log Likelihood  -1.247  
 
 
* 0.1p  ; ** 0.05p  ; *** 
0.01p   
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Mixed Logit Estimation results. 
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Attribute  
WTP 
(95% Conf. Int.) 
 
Alt. Spec. Const  
No knowledge  -€43***  
  (-€176 / -€91)  
Knowledge  -€243***  
  (-€491 / -€4)  
 Low income† Medium income† High income† 
Cost savings    
Younger than 36 €24*** €35*** €31*** 
 (€10 / €31) (€19 / €51) (€16 / €47) 
Age between 36 and 50 €18*** €29*** €26*** 
 (€6 / €31) (€15 / €43) (€13 / €39) 
Older than 50 €25*** €36*** €32*** 
 (€11 / €39) (€19 / €52) (€17 / €48) 
Comfort    
No impact  €124***  
  (€58 / €189)  
Load Shifting, little impact  €51  
  (-€3 / €105)  
Reduced comfort  -€175***  
  (-€260 / -€90)  
Functionality    
Only monitoring  -€46**  
  (-€99 / -€6)  
Monitoring and disconnection  €63**  
  (€8 / €118)  
Dynamic Management  -€17  
  (-€70 / €36)  
Privacy    
No effect  €184***  
  (€91 / €277)  
Load profile is communicated  -€11  
  (-€67 / €45)  
Profile communicated, intervention possible  -€173***  
  (-€256 / -€90)  
Visibility    
In the wall  €91***  
  (€28 / €154)  
On the wall  -€89**  
  (-€158 / -€20)  
In appliances  €-2  
  (-€52 / €48)  
° 95% Confidence interval, estimated with the Delta method. 
† 
Low income:   €2500; Medium income: €2500 – €4000; High income:   €4000 
* 0.1p  ; ** 0.05p  ; *** 0.01p   
Table 7: WTP values and 95% conf. interval based on the RPL model 3. 
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1. Reference Case (No prior knowledge; Percentage cost savings = 3%; Only monitoring; Installed on the wall) 
    Privacy impact  
   No effect comm. to DisCo DisCo controls Apps 
 
Impact on 
comfort 
¤ No effect  €306  €111  -€51 
 Little impact  €233  €38  -€124 
 Reduced Comfort  €7  -€188  -€350 
2. Reference case with percentage of cost saving = 7% 
    Privacy impact  
   No effect comm. to DisCo DisCo controls Apps 
 
Impact on 
comfort 
No effect  €426  €231  €69 
 Little impact  €353  €158  -€4 
 Reduced Comfort  €127  €-68  -€230 
3. Reference case with good prior knowledge 
    Privacy impact  
   No effect comm. to DisCo DisCo controls Apps 
 
Impact on 
comfort 
No effect  €506  €311  €149 
 Little impact  €433  €238  €76 
 Reduced Comfort  €207  €12  -€150 
4. Reference case with percentage of cost saving = 7% and good prior knowledge 
    Privacy impact  
   No effect comm. to DisCo DisCo controls Apps 
 
Impact on 
comfort 
No effect  €626  €431  €269 
 Little impact  €553  €358  €196 
 Reduced Comfort  €327  €132  -€30 
5. Reference case with monitoring and disconnection, and good prior knowledge 
    Privacy impact  
   No effect comm. to DisCo DisCo controls Apps 
 
Impact on 
comfort 
No effect  €615  €420  €258 
 Little impact  €542  €347  €185 
 Reduced Comfort  €316  €121  -€41 
6. Reference case with device installed in the wall and good prior knowledge 
    Privacy impact  
   No effect comm. to DisCo DisCo controls Apps 
 
Impact on 
comfort 
No effect  €686  €491  €329 
 Little impact  €613  €418  €256 
 Reduced Comfort  €387  €192  €30 
Table 8: Value of smart meters. 
